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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

DISABLED AMERICAN
VETERANS, UTAH STATE
DEPARTMENT
Respondent,

-vs.-

Case
No. 8989

VETERANS FOUNDATION,
a purported non-profit corporation,
Appella;n.t.

BRIEF O·F RESP·ONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Counsel for plaintiff adopts the same designation
of the parties as has appellant in their brief.
Plaintiff cannot accept appellant's "Statement of
Facts.'' We therefore submit our own Statement, and
will subsequently point out portions of appellant's statements which do not conform to Rule 75 (P) (2) (2), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.
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The issue in this case is simple, although the facts
are somewhat burdened by necessary reference to numerous documents.
The State Executive Committee of the Disabled
American Veterans in an official meeting appointed a
committee to act as its fiduciary agent and exercise a
written contract option (R. 10) to purchase the Veterans
Foundation, an active salvage business (R. 48). Later
the State Executive Committee decided to form a nonprofit corporation to handle this purchase. Defendants
Gray, Hendrixson, Young, and Mabey were named on
the original purchasing committee and also as members
of the original Board of Directors of the non-profit
corporation (R. 48 and 94). The official minutes of the
State Executive Committee clearly recite that the
operations of the non-profit corporation are to be principally for the benefit of the State Department of the
D A V (R. 95). Contracts were drawn as will be more
fully outlined hereinafter, and the salvage business was
purchased by Appellant after the Plaintiff assigned its
interest to Appellant in the option contract covering this
salvage business. The real issue in this case is whether
these defendants and appellant can now disregard the
terms of the resolution approving their appointment as
committee members and members of the Board of Directors and breach the written fiduciary obligations recited
in the contracts, resolutions and original articles of
incorporation of appellant Veterans Foundation.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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We will now document and substantiate the detailed
facts briefly referred to in the foregoing opening statement.
On or about September 9, 1952, plaintiff and Mr.
Orlo L. Ellison executed the contract marked Exhibit A
(R. 9-11 inclusive). It was prepared and attested by
defendant Gaylen S. Young as Judge Advocate of the
Department of Utah D. A. V. (R. 111). Under this contract 10% of the monthly gross sales of a salvage business known as "Veterans Foundation" were payable by
Mr. Ellison to the State Department of Utah D. A. V.
(R. 9-10). The contract also gives plaintiff an option
to buy said business from Mr. Ellison (R. 10). It was
to exercise this option on plaintiff's behalf that defendants, as a committee, were to function.
The pleadings show that plaintiff alleges and defendants and appellant admit that about June 1955 the
then State Commander appointed a committee and a
legal advisor to initiate and conclude a program for the
acquisition by plaintff from said Ellison of this salvage
business (R. 3 and 64). The official minutes of the State
Executive Committee (Exhibits J and K, R. 43-49) recite
these appointments. Defendants Gray, Hendrixson,
Young, Astle and Mabey, among others, were appointed
on said committee to negotiate this purchase for the
plaintiff State Department (R. 48).
The official minutes of the State Executive Committee of the Utah D. A. V. for December 4, 1955 contain a prepared written resolution which was read into
3
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said minutes by defendant Young (R. 95). This resolution approved the creation of a non-profit corporation
for the purpose of entering into a contract for the purchase of the salvage business from Mr. Ellison. It also
approved the assignment of the September 1952 contract
to the new non-profit corporation (R. 95). The articles
of incorporation for the new non-profit corporation
(appellant) were already prepared and were read by
defendant Young to the State Executive Committee and
approved this same day (R. 94). This resolution further
provided that the 1952 contract should be cancelled by
mutual consent at the time the non-profit corporation
entered into a purchase contract with Mr. Ellison for
the acquisition of the salvage business (R. 95).
The resolution contains this statement:
"It is further understood that the said Veterans Foundation, a non profit corporation, shall
be operated principally for and on behalf of the
disabled veterans as more particularly outlined
in Article IV of the Articles of Incorporation of
said 'Veterans Foundation' and that out of the
net profits of said corporation an amount equal
to 10% of the gross sales shall be paid to the
Department of Utah, Disabled American Veterans
by said Veterans Foundation and as much more
as may be possible shall be used for the objects
of said corporation's creation, all of which is to
be consistent with good business practice."
(Italics added) (R. 95)
The Article IV referred to in this resolution reads
as follows:
4
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''ARTICLE IV
"PURPOSE: The objects, business and pursuits of this corporation shall be:
''A. To aid and assist veterans, and particularly war-time disabled veterans, their widows,
their orphans, and their dependents, by providing
employment and rehabilitation opportunities; to
work with, or aid financially, any public or private
agencies devoted to the cause of improving and
advancing the condition, health and interest of
all wounded, gassed, injured and disabled veterans.
''B. To carry out the policies, purposes, ideals
and programs of the disabled American Veterans,
nationally and in the State of Utah.
"C. For the accomplishment of these objects,
this corporation shall have the power to engage
in the general salvage business, among other
things to solicit the public for second hand articles,
including clothing, furniture and other household
equipment and to repair and recondition the same
and to offer the same to the public for sale and to
use the net money received therefrom to carry
out the purposes and objects of this corporation.
''GENERAL POWERS : This corporation is
to have and exercise all the rights and powers
necessary to carry out its said objects and pursuits and to do and perform all the acts and things
necessary in pursuance of said objects and purposes to the same extent as natural persons might
or could do, at any place, either as principal or
agent, or as contractor, trustee, or otherwise,
alone or in company with others; to lease suitable
buildings and equipment; and to acquire, by purchase or gift, such personal and real property as
may be necessary to carry out the objects of this

5
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corporation; to receive donations of real and personal property to be applied to the uses and purposes of the corporation; to take, hold and manage
real and personal property conveyed to it in fee
or in trust, the income from which is to be applied
to the uses and purposes of this corporation, and
to execute such trusts; to mortgage or otherwise
incumber any of its property, or to sell and convey
the same, or to enter into any contract therewith.
The enumeration of any specific objects, purpose
or powers herein shall not be construed as a limitation or abridgement of the general powers of
the Association." (R. 17 -18)
There is no reference in Article IV as it was approved on December 4, 1955 to payment of any part of
the 10% of gross profits to local chapters (R. 17). Nor
was there any provision in said Article IV whereby the
State Department was required to make reports to appellant and authorizing appellant to judge the wisdom
of plaintiff's use of its own funds. Nor was there any
authorization to withhold funds in the future if appellant
desired (R. 17). The section IV quoted and referred to
by appellant throughout its brief which does purport
to authorize these things is an amendment adopted by
appellant in February 1957 (R. 32, 33 and 38). In fact
it was the adoption of these amendments to articles of
incorporation by appellant in February 1957, more than
any other single factor, which precipitated and resulted
in this litigation. It fathered the suspicion that appellant intended to divert plaintiff's funds to the local
chapters.

6
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Following the incorporation of appellant in December 1955, the assignment of the September 1952 contract
to the non-profit corporation was consummated by execution of Exhibit E, dated Feb. 17, 1956 (R. 22).
A short time later (February 29, 1956) appellant
and the Ellisons executed Exhibit F (R. 24-28) entitled
"Bill of Sale and Title Retaining Note and Agreement."
By the execution of this agreement appellant completed
its move into the shoes of plaintiff insofar as contract
relations with the Ellisons is concerned. Although plaintiff was not a party to this contract, it is most significant
to note that the contract provides that "the Veterans
Foundation a non-profit corporation, has agreed to give
to the said State Department of the Utah Disabled
American Veterans all of the substantial benefits said
organization is entitled to under the agreement with the
Ellisons" (R. 24). This contract also provides that ten
percent of the gross sales shall be paid to the Veterans
Foundation ''to make it possible for it to carry out its
commitment with the State Departmen,t of Utah Disabled American Veterans'' (R. 25).
In March of 1956 the National Adjutant of the Disabled American Veterans officially advised Defendant
Astle that the National Executive Committee approved
on a continuing basis, the fund raising project described
in the Ellison contract (Exhibit A) of September 1952
(R. 90). However Astle was advised that no changes
could be made in the operation or in the contract
describing the operation (R. 90).

7
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The National Adjutant then went on to say that he
had heard about the organization of the newly created
corporation called "Veterans Foundation." After analyzing its Articles of Incorporation and the minutes of
the State Executive Committee meeting of December 4,
1955 (R. 93-96) he concludes that the whole transaction
appears to "have been designed to circumvent Departmental control of its own fund raising project" (R. 90).
Defendant Astle was instructed that if changes in the
fund raising project had been made as reflected in the
December 4th minutes and the Articles of Incorporation
of Veterans Foundation that same must be submitted to
the National Executive Committee for review under its
reserved powers. Failure to submit these changes, said
the National Adjutant, would result in a recommendation
for National Executive Committee action to revoke plaintiff's Charter, or for the institution of legal action in
Utah courts to cause the revocation of the Charter of
Veterans Foundation (R. 91).
Subsequently correspondence passed between defendant Astle and the National Adjutant (R. 92) and
finally on September 19, 1956, the National Adjutant
advised the then State Commander that approval of the
amended fund raising project was conditioned upon
amendment of Article IV of appellant's Articles of
Incorporation "to provide that the purpose of the corporation shall be to operate and conduct a salvage business for the purpose of raising funds for use by the
Department of Utah, Disabled American Veterans (R.
101) (Italics added). Several other changes were re8
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quired but they are no longer at issue in this matter. The
National Executive Committee concluded its recommendations by requesting a submittal of the amended Articles
for national review "when at least two-thirds of the
chapters of Utah having a membership of more than
fifty (50) percent of the paid up membership in the
department" have approved the amendments (R. 102).
This approval was never obtained.
The answer of appellant recites in paragraph 11
that the National Executive Committee ruled that the
Articles of Incorporation of the Veterans Foundation
must be amended to provide that the ''purpose of the
corporation shall be to operate and conduct a salvage
business for the purpose of raising funds for use by the
Department of Utah, Disabled American Veterans.'' (R.
68).
Appellant's answer recites in considerable detail the
long negotiations which ensued in an effort to correct
the situation between the parties hereto (R. 62-78). In
February 1957 compromise amendments to appellant's
Articles of Incorporation were adopted by appellant and
considered by plaintiff, after considerable discussion
between the parties (R. 87). These amendments (R. 3237) were not acceptable to plaintiff and further efforts
to correct the situation followed (R. 87-88).
In September 1957 further amendments were adopted
to limit the membership of appellant to persons in good
standing of the Department of Utah D. A. V., to delete
the self perpetuating election procedures whereby de9
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fendants could remain indefinitely as Board Members
merely by nominating themselves, and to provide that
upon dissolution of appellant corporation if the Utah
Department no longer exists, then to turn any remaining
assets over to the National office for use in assisting
wartime disabled veterans, etc., living in Utah (R. 4142).
These amendments were presented to the protesting
local chapters in an effort to secure approval (R. 88) as
requested by the National Adjutant (R. 102). The
Thomas Chapter and the Holden Chapter were personally
visited by the Department Commander and Adjutant,
and plaintiff's attorney Mangum visited the Thomas
Chapter urging them to approve these amendments.
These two posts, having over 50% of state memberships,
still refused to approve the amendments. "Said officers
were unable to convince said Chapters that defendants
and appellant should have the powers that they had
usurped, and would not approve any power to defendants
to control the funds of plaintiff." (R. 88) Plaintiff has
at all times supported the Yeterans sal\age business (R.
89).
Despite repeated requests during a long period of
time appellant and defendants haYe refused to strike
from Article IV of their Articles of Incorporation the
provision adopted in February 1957 which authorized
diversion of funds to the local chapters instead of paying
the ton percent of gross sales to the State Department.
DefPndant Young in Chambers of the lower court on
September 3, 1958, categorically stated that defendants

10
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and appellant would never agree to the proposition that
the ten percent fund should be payable exclusively to
plaintiff as distinguished from the local chapters (R.
113).
On March 27, 1958 appellant notified plaintiff in
writing (Exhibit G) that no more funds would be paid
by appellant to plaintiff, and that the moneys would be
given to the local chapters and be used to pay taxes (R.
30). Until receipt by plaintiff of Exhibit "G" (R. 2930) terminating the ten percent payments, plaintiff had,
as alleged in paragraph XI of its complaint, hoped
defendants and appellant would yet honor their trust
and recognize plaintiff as the exclusive equitable owner
and beneficiary of appellant corporation. Plaintiff thereupon instituted this lawsuit.
The Disabled American Veterans, plaintiff in this
case, is a body corporate created by act of Congress.
Congress gave this corporation power to enter into contracts and to sue and be sued in courts of law and equity,
and also provided that this corporation could establish
state and territorial organizations and local chapter or
post organizations. Congress further provided that as
a condition precedent to the exercise of any power or
privilege granted or conferred, the Disabled American
Veterans shall file in the office of the secretary of each
State in which chapters are organized, the name and
postoffice address of an authorized agent in such State,
upon whom legal process or demands against the Disabled American Veterans may be served. (36 U.S.C.A.
90a, 90d, and 90j.)

11
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Plaintiff in an unchallenged sworn statement answering interrogatories in this case, states that they have
complied with the mandate of Congress by making the
proper filing with the Utah Secretary of State (R. 84).
Plaintiff in answering defendants' interrogatory
No. 1 relied on the constitution of the Department of
Utah, Disabled American Veterans, and the National
Constitution of the Disabled American Veterans (R. 84).
Article IX, Section 1, of the State Constitution, provides
that the National Constitution and by-laws of D A V are
made a part of the State Constitution (R. 114-115).
Article IV· of the National Constitution specifically provides for the power to sue and be sued (R. 115).
Defendants Hendrixson, Reese, Mabey, Gray, Young,
Astle and Ellison have not appealed from the judgment
of the lower court, the only party filing an appeal being
appellant Veterans Foundation (R. 131).
Defendants Hendrixson, Reese, Mabey, Gray and
Young are enjoined by a final judgment from withholding payments to plaintiff of ten percent of the gross
volume of sales of appellant (R. 129). These same defendants are also under a final court order to amend
the articles of incorporation of appellant (R. 129). All
were Board Members at the time this suit was filed.
The Statement of Facts in appellant's brief (pages
2-11) fails to comply ·with Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
in several important statements which we will point out.
Other similar discrepancies appear throughout theiT brief
and will be noted hereafter.
12
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1. Page 2 of appellant's brief makes no reference
to the record as a source for the information there recited
as required by Rule 75 (P) (2) (2).

2. On page 3 of its brief appellant cites its own
answer as the source of the information recited (R. 76).
Plaintiff has the benefit of an automatic denial of facts
pleaded by an answer for purposes of a motion for summary judgment. This is therefore a controverted statement.
3. No reference to the record is made by appellant
with respect to the facts recited in the last two paragraphs on page 6 of its brief.
4. No reference to the record is made by appellant
with respect to the first full sentence beginning at the
top of page 10 of its brief.
Plaintiff will argue this matter under the following
Statement of Points:
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
PLAINTIFF IS A STATUTORY "SUBDIVISION" OF
A BODY CORPORATE CREATED BY ACT OF CONGRESS WITH STATUTORY POWER TO SUE.

POINT II
THE ORDER OF THE COURT ENJOINING APPELLANT FROM FURTHER WITHHOLDING PAY-

13
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MENTS TO PLAINTIFF OF TEN PERCENT OF GROSS
VOLUME OF SALES OF VETERAN'S FOUNDATION
IS PROPER AND VALID.

POINT III
THE ORDER OF THE COURT REQUIRING APPELLANT TO AMEND AND CHANGE ARTICLE IV OF
APPELLANT'S ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION IS
PROPER AND VALID.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFF IS A STATUTORY "SUBDIVISION'' OF
A BODY CORPORATE CREATED BY ACT OF CONGRESS WITH STATUTORY POWER TO SUE.

Plaintiff in this case is the Disabled American Veterans, Utah State Department. Plaintiff is a statutory
''subdivision'' of the national corporation, and one of
the entities given sole and exclusive right to have and
use the name "Disabled American Veterans," 36
USCA 90h.
Disabled American Veterans, incorporated by Act
of Congress, was by statute given the specific power to
establish State organizations. 36 USCA 90d. Appellant
admits that plaintiff is an organization established by
the Dis a bled American Veterans pursuant to section 90d
of Chapter 6A, Title 30, USCA. (Appellant's answer,
R.. 62) Disabled American Veterans is doing business in
the State of Utah by virtue of this filing and thus entitled
to resort to the courts of the State. See Gallaher vs.

14
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American Legion,, 277 N.Y.S. 81, and Harris v. American
Degion, 162 Fed. Supp. 700.
There is no dispute about the existence of Disabled
American Veterans, Utah State Department. It has a
constitution which has been recognized and accepted by
the national body. This constitution recites that the
Utah Department has the power to sue (R. 114-115).
Plaintiff in this case is not an unincorporated association. On the contrary, plaintiff is a state subdivision
of a national corporation, which subdivision was created
pursuant to a statutory power given by Congress. The
national corporation created by Congress is given not
only power to sue, but also to establish state organizations and to do any and all acts and things necessary
and proper to carry out the purposes of the corporation.
36 USCA 90d.
This power given by Congress to "Disabled American Veterans'' to establish state organizations is not
unlike the power given by Congress to national banks
to establish branch banks. There is no doubt about the
right of a branch of a national bank to contract and sue.
It is merely an appendage or extension of the national
bank, and does business in the name of the parent organization with a parenthetical identification as to the
location of the branch. See 12 USCA 36. In fact we
see this illustrated every day here in Salt Lake City by
references to national banks and their branches.
None of the unincorporated associations involved
in the cases cited by and relied upon by appellant traced
15
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their origin to statutes. For this reason the cases relied
upon by appellant are not in point.
On the other hand the Utah Supreme Court, just
as the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,
can and we feel should decide this case even if we assume
pliantiff to be an unincorporated association, by its sense
of justice. In Busby v. Electric Utilities Employees
Union, 147 Fed. 2d 865, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia held that an unincorporated trade
union had, in view of its power, influence, size, activities,
purposes and aims, the capacity to sue and be sued
irrespective of enabling legislation. The court remarked
that the sense of justice required such a ruling. Certainly the sense of justice requires that plaintiff, who
has statutory origins, be allowed to sue to enforce its
contracts and fiduciary rights. This court is bound only
by its own sense of justice and its own precedents. This
court is not bound by the Federal District Court ruling
in Americarn. Newspaper Guild -z,·. Macki'YIInon, 108 F.
Supp. 312, and can enter a judgment consistent with
equity and fair play just as the Circuit Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia did in the Busby case, supra.
Appellant no\Y claims certain property rights in the
salvage business known as Veterans Foundation. Where
did these property rights originate? Defendant Young,
as judge advoeate of plaintiff, prepared a contract
whereby plaintiff contracted with the Ellisons for the
establishment and ultimate purchase of the veterans
salvnge business by plaintiff. Defendant Young also
prepared the assignment (Exhibit E) whereby plaintiff

16
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assigned its rights in this business to appellant. Defendants Astle and Mabey signed this assignment in
behalf of plaintiff.
The defendant members of the Board of Directors
of appellant are all fiduciary agents of plaintiff, and
under the leadership of the trusted legal advisor, defendant Young, betrayed the trust reposed in themselves
and undertook to give themselves permanent control of
appellant and of plaintiff's funds, in violation of these
fiduciary obligations. Appellant even denies the legal
existence of plaintiff and says it cannot sue to protect
the rights which its then judge advocate wrote into the
contract documents. We believe appellants are estopped
from taking this position and the sense of justice of this
court will preclude any such result.
In summary, we submit that plaintiff is a creature
of statute, not a common law association. Plaintiff's
existence and powers originated in the Act of Congress.
Plaintiff does have the power to sue to enforce its legal
rights and contracts, and defendants and appellant are
estopped by their own previous conduct from denying
this legal status of plaintiff.
POINT II
THE ORDER OF THE COURT ENJOINING APPELLANT FROM FURTHER WITHHOLDING PAYMENTS TO PLAINTIFF OF TEN PERCENT OF GROSS
VOLUME OF SALES OF VETERAN'S FOUNDATION
IS PROPER AND VALID.

17
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If appellant has the legal right to ignore its commitments to pay ten percent of its gross volume of sales
to plaintiff, and can divert these funds to the local
chapters or elsewhere at its whim, then it is certainly
true that the State Department has lost control of its
own fund raising project. Actually the contrary is true.
The non-profit corporation which was created to purchase
the veterans salvage business was born with an obligation already spelled out and agreed to by the terms of
the resolution authorizing defendants to incorporate
"Veterans Foundation." This resolution recited "out
of the net profits of said corporation an amount equal
to ten percent of the gross sales shall be paid to the
Department of Utah, Disabled American Veterans by
said Veterans Foundaiton * * * '' (R. 95). After the
appellant was duly incorporated it first took an assignment from plaintiff of the latter's rights in the salvage
business. Next it asserted one of these rights by exercising an option to purchase the business from the Ellisons. This was done in a formal written document (R.
24-28). Three conclusive clauses appear in this contract
between appellant and the Ellisons. They are:
1. "Whereas, said Yeterans organization (State
Department D A V) is desirous of exercising its
option to purchase said business and has caused
to be or(Janizcd a non profit corporation under the
laws or' the State of Utah under the name of
Veterans Foundation and has assigned to said
non profit corporation all of its rights in said
agreement for the purpose of exercising the option
to purelwse said business \Yhich is to be operated
for and on behalf of the disabled -veterans, and"
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(parenthetical language and italics added)
24).

(R.

2. "Whereas the Veterans Foundation, a non
profit corporation has agreed to give to the said
State Department of the Utah Disabled American
Veterans all of the substantial benefits said organization is entitled to under its agreement with
Ellisons, and" (R. 24) (italics added).
3. ''Ten percent of the gross sales shall be paid
to the First Party (Appellant) to make it possible
for it to carry out its commitment with the State
Department of Utah Disabled American Veterans
(parenthetical language and italics added) (R.
25).
Those three contractual excerpts sustain every contention of plaintiff. Appellant is a fiduciary entity
created by plaintiff to serve plaintiff. Appellant has
acknowledged this relationship and obligation in a binding third party beneficiary contract. Appellant has also
admitted these same three matters by its answer as
recited in paragraph 8, (R. 67). These admissions in
the answer are ample authority for the entry of the
summary judgment.
Despite these facts appellant, on March 27, 1958,
notified plaintiff that no more funds would be paid to
plaintiff (R. 29-30). Plaintiff moved for a preliminary
injunction to prevent appellant from withholding the
funds due to plaintiff (R. 50-51). After argument on
this motion the parties stipulated for the deposit of the
ten percent of gross sales with the clerk of the lower court
for the month of May 1958 (R. 53). Subsequent motions
were made to impound the money for later months and
19
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on September 15, 1958 the lower court ordered the
monthly ten percent payments to be made to the clerk
of the court until further order be issued (R. 128). On
November 14, 1958 the lower court ordered that the funds
on deposit be paid by the clerk of the court to the plaintiff (R. 130).
This actual history demonstrates most clearly the
need for a permanent court order enjoining the withholding. Apparently appellant would have plaintiff file
an action at law for each monthly payment as it becomes
due, instead of disposing of the matter permanently by
an injunction. One of the most common uses of the
injunctive power is to obviate a multiplicity of suits,
the proper remedy in this case.
However, appellant questions the propriety of the
injunctive process herein and cites 28 Am. Juris., page
350, section 159, as authority. We have read this paragraph and believe it is direct authority for the use of an
injunction against a corporation. The text provides that
corporations "ma~T be restrained from actual or threatened breaches of contract.'' By cross reference footnote
we find this language from 28 Am. Juris., page 270,
section 77:
''A court of equity ·will endeavor, to the extent
of its povvers, to bind men's consciences so far as
they can be bound to a true and literal performance of their agreements, and will not suffer them
to depart from their contracts at pleasure, leaving the party ,,~ith whom they have contracted to
the mere chance of any damages which a jury may
gn'f'. It will, therefore, in a proper case, enforce
20
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a contract by enjoining violations of the terms
thereof * * *. ''
Appellant has also erroneously cited language from
Fletcher's Cyclopedia on Corporations. The language
quoted by appellant is directed at the use of injunctions
by a stockholder against management and internal
affairs of a corporaton. Plaintiff is not suing as a stockholder. Plaintiff has direct contract rights, fiduciary
rights, and also contract rights of a third party beneficiary which it is seeking to enforce. The cases and
texts cited by appellant are not in point as authority
against the use of an injunction in this case.
We are surprised to find appellant quoting from and
relying upon amended Article IV of its Articles of Incorporation. The very adoption of this amended article
precipitated much of the current controversy. This
amendment was adopted in February 1957, in an abortive
attempt by appellant to support its position that it could
divert the ten percent of gross sales away from plaintiff.
Appellant then also assumed to itself the power to review
plaintiff's use of its own money, and the right to withhold further payments to plaintiff. These are the very
things plaintiff challenges and were the basis for the
refused approval of the amendments by the Thomas and
Holden chapters. No executed contract made by a corporation with a third party or for the benefit of a third
party can be impaired by any alteration of its own
charter power. 13 Am. J ur ., page 242, section 96. As
regards creditors of a corporation who contract with the
corporation on the faith of the security afforded by the
21
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charter, there may be such a contractual obligation as
will be entitled to constitutional protection. This means
that constitutional law precepts prevent amendment of
the charter if the amendments impair the obligations of
contracts. 13 Am. Jur., page 225, section 81.
It is settled law that a corporation has no power to
adopt by-laws which impair or destroy the obligations
of contracts or vested rights.
''A corporation has not the capacity, as the
legislative power from which it derives existence
has not competency, by- laws of its own enactment
to disturb or divest rights which it had created,
or to impair the obligation of its contracts, or to
change its responsibilities * * *.'' Knights of
Golden Rule v. Ainsworth, 71 Ala. 436. See also
Fletcher Cyclopedia of Corporations, Vol. 8, pp.
715 et seq.
The same legal principles preclude adoption of
amendments to articles of incorporation which impair
obligations of contracts.
The amendments made by appellant ·whereby appellant assumes the right to withhold moneys which
legally belong to plaintiff, and to justify this because of
the changed charter proYisions alone, runs squarely into
the prohibition against impairment of the obligation of
contracts. Appellant rannot thus, b~- its unilateral action,
"lift itself b~' its own bootstraps" and defeat plaintiff's
rights. This leads us Yery naturall~- into the discussion
of Point III of this brief.
22
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POINT III
THE ORDER OF THE COURT REQUIRING APPELLANT TO AMEND AND CHANGE ARTICLE IV OF
APPELLANT'S ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION IS
PROPER AND VALID.

Since plaintiff's contract rights cannot be impaired
by appellant's device of simply amending its own charter,
there must remain in ' the courts the power to order
amendments to protect those rights. The enjoining
action of the lower court may partially protect plaintiff,
but plaintiff and the lower court both thought equity
and justice required that appeilant's claimed right to
divert plaintiff's funds to others should be stricken from
its articles. Certainly the order to amend the Articles
supplements and supports the injunction.
Defendants acted in a fiduciary capacity when they
incorporated appellant. Defendants and appellant admit
in their answer that defendants "have always regarded
themselves as trustees for all the members of the D A V
in Utah,'' * * * and regard themselves under the law
subject to a high degree of fidelity.'' (R. 75) It is well
settled that an organizer under these conditions sustains
a relation of trust and confidence to the corporation.
This is especially true of charitable organizations. The
courts impose the fiduciary obligation of an agent or
trustee upon such organizers, in order to prevent fraud
or inequitable dealings or to work out contract rights.
Defendants are already under final court orders which
could only have been entered as recognition of this
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fiduciary relationship. See Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporations, Permarnent Edition, Vol. 1, pp. 611-612.
Of course a court of equity has the power to order
a non profit eleemosynary corporation such as appellant
to delete material from its amended articles when there
is no dispute about the fact that the added language
clearly violates fiduciary and trust obligations. Non
profit eleemosynary corporations such as appellant are
subject to extreme powers of visitation by courts of
equity. See 49 Harvard Law Review 369, "Visitatorial
Jurisdiction over Corporations in Equity" by Roscoe
Pound.
Appellant has improperly gone outside the record
1n this case and set forth considerable material with
the obvious intention and hope of influencing this court.
We refer particularly to the discussion about political
control of plaintiff appearing at pages 17 and 18 of
appellant's brief. We do not believe it would be proper
for us to compound this error by setting forth rebuttal
material, also outside the record. Obviously appellant
is critical of the constitutional politics of the Disabled
American Veterans. It finds fault with the method of
selecting delegates, and with the voting strength which
these delegates have on the floor of state conventions.
We believe this to be absolutely immaterial in this case.
We take special exception to the charge at page 18 of
appellant's brief that if control of the fund raising
project is lodged in plaintiff that this would result in
ehn nging officers and directors of appellant with each
change of D A V officers. Appellant is ignoring the most
24
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important role which the Articles of Incorporation of
appellant, as amended, play in determining election and
removal of directors and officers of appellant. The
directors of appellant are elected for fixed terms and
can only be removed by two-thirds vote of the members
present and voting at the annual meeting (R. 42).
If we assume the facts are as appellant asserts them
to be, it is easy to see why appellant and defendants are
fighting so vigorously to divert funds to the local chapters. Appellant asserts at page 18 of its brief that the
voting power of plaintiff is such that one or two of the
fourteen local chapters may control plaintiff by reason
of having large memberships. It is now obvious why
appellant wants to give ten percent of its gross sales to
the local chapters instead of to plaintiff. Economic
coercion and the power of the purse would freeze defendants and appellant in perpetual control of the state
organization so long as this appellant could grant or
withhold the ten percent fund to local chapters at its
whim and caprice. Political loyalty could be exacted as
the toll for receipt of money. However, we believe this
whole discussion is out of order and immaterial to the
issues before this court. The internal politics of the
D A V is not before this court for judicial approval in
this case. Contract and fiduciary obligations are before
the court. The record is more than ample to sustain the
summary judgment entered below.
Appellant also went outside the record on page 20
of its brief by citing and quoting from Article II, Section
3 of plaintiff's constitution. Even though this material
25
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1s improperly before the court, we feel compelled to
comment on the fallacious argument based thereon.
None of the defendants who are members of the D A V
are a.ppellarn.ts in this matter. Appellant Veterans Foundation is not a D A V member. Furthermore the quoted
section does not even apply to plaintiff, but only restricts
the bringing of suits by local chapters, not the State
Department. Thus no one is before this court with any
color of right to rely on the articles quoted or complain
about the suit on these grounds.
Courts of equity have extremely broad powers to
effectuate their decisions. As the Circuit Court said in
Un.ited States v. American Tobacco Co., 191 Fed. 371,
at 386, ''The evils found to exist alone indicate the
measure required to meet them.'' In anti-trust and
monopoly cases we very frequently find courts ordering
dissolution of corporations, divestiture of assets, creation of new corporations, and enjoining of actions.
There is nothing very startling about the lower
court's order to appellant and defendants to amend
appellant's articles. Appellant is simply directed to
delete an illegal assumption of power which was first
inserted by amendments in February-1957. The language
which the court has ordered appellant to strike from its
articles purported to give the Board of Directors of
appellant (who a.rC' defendants in this case) the discretionary power to divert funds from the State Department to the local chapters. It is perfectly proper for a
court of equity to use its ancillary powers to order a
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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charitable non profit corporation and its individual
board members to strike this illegally assumed power
from its charter.
All of the cases cited by appellant as denying a
court the right to intervene in internal affairs of a
corporation recognize that a court can intervene when
fraud or abuse of power or oppressive actions are involved. What greater abuse is there in the eyes of the
law than the betrayal of a :fiduciary trust~ Defendants
and appellant have denied their :fiduciary obligations
with plaintiff, and asserted their intention to continue
this denial. Equity can order a non profit, non stock
corporation to delete such illegally assumed powers from
its articles.
We are not bothered about the contempt problems
raised by appellant on page 22 of its brief. Defendants
Hendrixson, Reese, Mabey, Gray and Young (Board
members of appellant) are already in violation of a :final
court order requiring amendment of appellant's articles.
If plaintiff prevails in this court, we have no doubt that
contempt citations to defendants and appellant, if necessary, will very promptly result in the proper amendments being made. This court is not without the means
to enforce a judgment ordering amendment.

In Arbour v. Pittsburgh Produce Trade Ass'n., 44
Pa. Super, 240, the suit was in equity by a retail produce
dealer to enjoin a trade association, incorporated under
a general law, from enforcing by-laws by which the
members were required to refuse to sell on credit or for
27
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spot cash to any person indebted to any member of the
association. Provision was also made for arbitration by
members of the association of claims of members against
persons blacklisted as delinquent in meeting indebtedness to members. A decree ordering that the words ''or
for spot cash" be stricken out, that the provision as to
arbitration by members of the association be declared
void, and that the association be enjoined from making
or enforcing any such by-laws was affirmed. This same
court also quoted and approved the following language
from State ex rel Cuppel vs. Milwaukee Chamber of
Commerce, 47 Wis. 670:
''The visitorial or superintending power of
the state over corporations created by the legislature will always be exercised, in proper cases,
through the medium of the courts of the state to
keep those corporations within the limits of their
lawful powers * * *. ''
Non profit charitable corporations are clothed with
a public interest which makes them even more subject
to powers of courts of equity than private profit corporations. Courts exercising their broad equity powers
may function in a visitorial manner, particularly over
a charitable corporation. See 49 Harcard Law Review
369.

Plaintiff 1s compelled to comment upon one more
factual assertion of appellant which is not supported
by the record. On page 18 of its brief appellant states
that none of the officers or directors of appellant (defendants) receive any material benefit by serving the
28
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appellant corporation. Plaintiff denies this and cites
appellant's and defendants' admissions in their answer
(R. 73) as proof that this statement is untrue. Some
peculiar motivation prompts defendants to persist in
their claimed right to substitute their personal desires
for their legal obligations with respect to plaintiff's
funds, and it appears to be both pecuniary arnd political.
Appellant challenges the power of the court to order
amendment of appellant's articles because this was not
included in plaintiff's prayer for relief. Any court of
equity can refuse to grant relief requested and in lieu
thereof grant some alternative relief. Skinrner v. Red-

ding, (Delaware), 48 A. 2d 809. Plaintiff asked the lower
court to remove defendants as directors of appellant,
which the court declined to do. In lieu thereof the court
ordered the amendment of appellant's articles, a very
proper alternative.
CONCLUSION
There could be no more persuasive or conclusive
proof of the betrayal of their fiduciary trust by defendants and appellant than the necessity and existence of
this very litigation. The persistent denial to plaintiff
of its own funds, and the vigorous fight to retain the
power to divert these funds for political or pecuniary
profit to defendants compels a judgment requiring appellant to amend its articles and enjoining appellant from
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further withholding payments to plaintiff of ten percent
of the gross volume of sales of appellant. The judgment
of the lower court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

RICH, ELTON & MANGUM
Attorneys for Respondent
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